Paws and Effect: The Price of Putting Man at the Centre of Animal Studies

Written By: Lily Dorranian

A Philosophical Essay

Morgan’s Canon (MC) is a founding principle of comparative psychology, coined by C. Lloyd Morgan Canon. MC is the relative law of parsimony concerning the field of study relating to non-human animals, asserting that an action of an animal should not be interpreted as the outcome of a high cognitive capacity if it could be explained by simpler/evolutionary faculties. It was a principle that was created in an attempt to reduce anthropomorphic bias, where researchers would only value results of studies where animals would exhibit traits that are seen as humans; the results of such would be considered ‘uninteresting and killjoy’ (Shuttleworth 2010). This bias inadvertently became the yardstick for which animals are more valuable than others, causing dire consequences, such as researchers overcomplicating results on purpose to hold value and encouraging both epistemic and moral speciesism. MC, though an objective standard, still requires discretion to be exercised, and this aspect, many philosophers argue, encourages undermining, undervaluing, and underattribution to the study of non-human animals. In recent years, there has been a focus on how the underattribution of characteristics and value to non-human animals has only encouraged moral and epistemic speciesism further and has footing in the political realm, with some philosophers and sociologists arguing that speciesism underpins both human and nonhuman rights, specifically ableism.

In this paper, I will first argue that MC should not be adopted in the studies of comparative cognition, establishing that if it is, the result of said adoption would yield results that are counterintuitive by encouraging a rise in anthropocentric bias rather than anthropomorphic. I will then critically examine leading arguments, the scope including ethical, political, and academic dilemmas, both for and against the adoption of MC into the field of comparative cognition. The paper will conclude with my original argument against the incorporation of MC but will explain any points I will concede validity to.

My argument

MC was formulated in response to Darwin’s ‘unsupported anthropomorphism’, as well as Thorndike’s practical applications (Shettleworth, 2010). Though MC was created in an attempt to correct unsupported anthropomorphism and thus anthropomorphic bias, it in turn encouraged anthropocentric bias, the former concept acting in reliance upon the latter (de Waal 1999).

My argument is based on the semantical phrasing of MC. Though it may seem superficial, it indicates deeper issues pertaining to how inherent our anthropocentric bias has become and how the neutral seeming state does in fact carry weight in a social, political, and ethical context.

Before I begin my analysis, I will establish the meanings of both concepts. Anthropomorphic bias is defined as the unjustified attribution of human capabilities to other creatures (Wynne, 2004). Anthropocentric bias is defined as the tendency to consider that human characteristic ways of experiencing, conceiving, and thinking provide the criterion or “gold standard” for understanding the behaviour of non-human animals (Scotto, 2024).

MC’s use of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ has become grounds for a variety of issues of which I will examine.

ACADEMIC/ETHICAL CONTEXT

Various academic concerns arise from the potential adoption of MC into the field of comparative cognition. To note that C. Lloyd Canon explains MC in these terms:

“In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.” (Morgan, 1903, p. 292)

The first issue many philosophers have noted is the use of the terms “higher” and "lower.”.

The use of this language asserts that animals should be considered by default to have lower cognitive capacities, which, by implication of the language in this canon, means that the being is intellectually inferior and thus less valuable than one of a “higher physical faculty," like Homosapiens. This reinforces anthropocentric biases, as the “intellectually superior” state of human beings will become the standard for gaining a result that is of "value." Anthropocentric bias carries an array of ethical dilemmas and dangers if encouraged. Firstly, the dichotomous state that MC presents between “higher” and “lower” implies that there are only two sets of values we can apply to a non-human animal. The exclusion or indifference to encouraging a middle ground denies researchers the ability to explain varied behaviours in differing species according to which processes are occurring—cognitive and associative—is a dilemma that could extend into the realm of human psychology (Andrews, 2009). Objectively, this may enable researchers to omit this factor of research into non-human animals, ultimately undermining, undervaluing, and under attributing results, and thus the outcome of their experiment would not be unique, or the result is a “killjoy”. Secondly, MC is an objective principle; it relies heavily on the discretion of researchers to exercise their studies ethically. With the omission of cognitive and associative processes, research results may not be as accurate as they should be, as there is a specific goal that a researcher is trying to interpret the results to mean.

The reaction or support that a study is given that adheres to anthropocentric bias will only further the cause, as ‘enthusiasm of the popular and even scientific press for clever animal stories nourishes this tendency: killjoy explanations are less likely to make headlines than stories about how octopi or birds are unexpectedly human-like’.

Thus, adoption of MC could possibly set comparative cognitive research back decades, as the results that are “valuable” or “groundbreaking” will revolve around a human-centric view of value, which is tantamount to a denial of mental continuity between humans and other animals (Shuttleworth, 2010). Mental continuity is a vital aspect for researchers to recognise and uphold, because instead of viewing human cognition as fundamentally separate or superior (like MC encourages), this perspective highlights the evolutionary links and gradual changes in mental capacities, encouraging researchers to study cognitive abilities in a comparative framework (Shuttleworth, 2010). This is important as a comparative framework would foster ‘greater appreciation of such mechanisms in nonhuman species and would contribute to a deeper, more truly comparative psychology’ (Shuttleworth, 2012).

POLITICAL CONTEXT

To begin with an examination of MC within a political context, I would like to observe a warning that Morgan himself wrote (Scotto, 2024):

“[T]o interpret animal behaviour, one must also learn to see one’s own mentality at levels of development much lower than one’s top-level of reflective self-consciousness. It is not easy and savours somewhat of paradox” (Morgan 1930, 250).

This warning emphasises the need to acknowledge simpler, more basic mental mechanisms that are present in oneself, akin to those seen in animals. Essentially, it calls for humility in our understanding of cognition, urging us to avoid an anthropocentric view that assumes humans are categorically superior in their mental abilities. Yet, in his attempt to avoid anthropocentric bias, Morgan inadvertently suggests that humans are the pinnacle of cognitive development, even while acknowledging the existence of simpler mental processes. Scotto notes that this is a variety of anthropocentric bias called anthropofabulation: ‘the “tendency to link competency criteria for cognitive abilities to an exaggerated sense of typical human erformance." (Scotto, 2024: Buckner, 2013). As a result of anthropocentric bias, both psychological and moral speciesism finds its footing in the field of comparative cognition.

In recent years, there has been significant recognition of the importance of animal ethics within the political landscape. There have been several theories that discuss how political institutions and processes can be transformed to guarantee justice for animals (Cochrane, Garner, & O’Sullivan 2018). Speciesism can be defined as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (Ryder, 2017). Moral speciesism is based on the moral or ethical perceptions an individual has about the rights of a non-animal being. A lot of theory and political discourse rests on the sentience of an animal, but its sentience is largely based on the anthropocentric scale of how we value outcomes in a human-centric context. If we adhere to the hierarchies that MC encourages, all animals are inferior to humans, but some animals are more inferior to others. This raises further issues: is it fair to deem one animal to have more value in a human-centric context than another, and should that give priority or recognition of sentience to? Then it is a question: what is the extent of their sentience? Can they feel pain? Are they able to recognise they are being deprived of opportunities? The issue MC poses to these questions is that the answer is subjective and left to the discretion of the researcher. There have been studies where animals have been observed to experience and know feelings such as freedom (Gruen 2018; Schmidt 2015) and meaning (Purves & Delon 2018). But each of these outcomes would be of different value to different researchers.

A human-centric context will always be the foundational basis whenever discretion needs to be applied. In the case of MC, it is an objective test, thus discretion is of the utmost importance; however, an alternative could include subjective tests that are relevant and specific to the circumstances of each study. She argues further that ‘no sort of explanation should be accepted without good evidence, and good evidence comes only from imaginative, well-informed, and rigorous formulation and testing of alternatives.’ Though this is not a final and proper solution, it is one that is theorised to reduce the amount of anthropocentric bias when the focus/standard of value is relevant to the previous understandings and studies of that specific species. Shettleworth argues this further, stating that ‘insights from animals should replace the anthropomorphic concept of the cognitive map’ (Shuttleworth, 2010).

Additionally, in recent years of political discourse concerning the ethics of speciesism, there have been new theories that suggest that speciesism is inextricably linked to ableism. Scholars, particularly Sunaura Taylor, have argued that the oppression and injustice experienced by animals and disabled humans are interconnected through both speciesism and ableism, and thus their potentiality for social justice is just as connected (Jenkins et al., Citation 2020; S. Taylor, Citation 2017). Taylor’s work specifically deals with this exact area of political theory. She argues that “ableist paradigms of language and cognitive ability" frame both the definitions of animality and humanity. She further argues that disability activism is founded on "new ways of valuing life that aren't limited by specific physical or mental capabilities" (57). This can be directly linked back to the language used in MC and the hierarchies imposed from the terms “higher” and "lower." However, Taylor is careful to distinguish her position from one that likens intellectually disabled people to a state of animality. In fact, she recognises that speciesism and ableism are reliant on each other to create an exclusionary society.

One of the main pieces of evidence of the shared logic between speciesism and ableism is the ability of humans to possess language, autonomy, and the ability to reason. These abilities are not just used as a standard/benchmark to draw distinctions between humans and animals (regarding sentience and moral value) but also are used in an attempt to “exclude neurodiverse disabled humans from moral consideration” (Jenkins et al., 2020).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this essay has argued that Morgan’s Canon should not be adopted in the field of comparative cognition. Despite its relevance and value to the history of research and ethology, the application of this canon to the field would yield counterintuitive results. In an academic context, many ethical dilemmas would arise, such as a rise in misinterpretation or under attribution of results/outcomes of a study in hopes of achieving a result that is “valuable” in an anthropocentric context. Within a political context, Morgan’s canon, especially in recent years, has shown to be encouraging anthropocentric bias in a way that systematically denies animals, individuals with a disability, and/or neurodiverse individuals certain rights or inclusions into society.

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